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Risk-neutral individuals take more risky decisions when they have limited liability. Risk-
neutral managers may not when acting as agents under contract and taking costly actions to 
acquire information before taking decisions. Limited liability makes it optimal to increase the 
reward for outcomes relatively more likely to arise from desirable than from undesirable 
actions. The resulting decisions may be less, rather than more, risky. Making a decision after 
acquiring information provides an additional reason to those in the classic principal-agent 
literature for using contracts with pay increasing in the return. Further results on the form of 
contracts are also derived. 
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It is widely held that the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis was exacerbated, if not caused, by execu-
tives making more risky decisions than shareholders would have thought appropriate.
Alan Greenspan commented: “I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interests of
organizations, speciﬁcally banks and others, were such that they were best capable of
protecting their own shareholders” (Testimony to Congress, quoted in The Guardian,
24October2008). Thecauseiswidelythoughttobetheuseofbonusesforperformance
combined with limited liability. Limited liability introduces a convexity into the utility
function because all outcomes below the level at which limited liability binds result in
the same utility, so a risk-neutral person with limited liability makes decisions like a
risk lover. But that is not a complete argument. Executives work as agents under a
contract and, in drawing up that contract, a ﬁrm’s owner (principal) should take the
limited liability into account and design the contract to counteract it. So does limited
liability, combined with performance bonuses, really result in more risky decisions
when an optimal contract is used?
In answer to that question, this paper formalizes the following intuition. A risk-
neutral executive or manager can always be induced to make the decision preferred
by a risk-neutral principal with the same information by a contract that makes com-
pensation an increasing linear function of the return to the principal. The reason is that
replacing the principal’s linear objective function by a different, but order-preserving,
linear objective function does not affect the maximizing decision — it just corresponds
to an afﬁne transformation of a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. So, if
all the information for making the decision were readily available, there would be no
problem: the principal could simply use a linear contract with a very small slope and
with an intercept that satisﬁes the limited liability constraint and is sufﬁcient to induce
the agent to participate. It is not so simple if the agent has to be induced to incur effort
to acquire information on which to base the decision. The principal could, of course,
still avoid distorting decisions by using a linear contract with a slope steep enough to
induce effort. But with an intercept sufﬁciently large to satisfy limited liability, that
might prove a very expensive way for the principal to induce effort. The cost of induc-
ing effort could be reduced by reducing the reward for outcomes that are less likely
to occur if the agent has not actually put in the effort to acquire the appropriate in-
formation. If those outcomes are the less risky ones, the agent will optimally end up
taking more risky decisions than the principal would given the same information. But
those outcomes might alternatively be the riskier ones, in which case the agent will
optimally end up making less risky decisions.
Straightforward as this intuition is, deriving it formally in a general setting is not
so straightforward. As Grossman and Hart (1983) noted, principal-agent models are
notoriously difﬁcult for deriving precise results in general formulations. But it is nev-
1ertheless informative to formalize that intuition in a simple setting. That is what this
paper does.
The general framework is the following. A manager is employed to make a deci-
sion and is rewarded on the resulting return. Before making the decision, the manager
can take a (costly) action that reveals privately-observed information about the re-
turns from the possible decisions. The riskiness of the optimal decision can then be
compared with and without limited liability. The costly action is an essential part of
this. Without that, as noted above, there is no reason to distort decisions for incen-
tive reasons. The framework is a direct extension of the classic principal-agent model
studied by Mirrlees (1999), Holmström (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983). If the
information generated by the manager’s action were veriﬁable and payment could be
based directly on that, the framework would reduce to that classic model.
A number of papers in the literature have analysed optimal contracts for risk-
neutral agents with limited liability in this general framework, for example, Diamond
(1998), Biais and Casamatta (1999), Palomino and Prat (2003), Feess and Walzl (2004),
and Gromb and Martimort (2007).1 But of these, only Palomino and Prat (2003), in an
applicationtodelegatedportfoliochoice, addressthequestionoftheimpactofoptimal
contract choice on the riskiness of the agent’s decisions. They conclude that portfolio
managers may make either more, or less, risky decisions when they have limited li-
ability but their result relies on the “ﬁrst-order approach” being valid, which they
cannot guarantee. Moreover, they limit the distributions of returns for each decision
to those characterised by two parameters, the mean and riskiness of a portfolio. Biais
and Casamatta (1999), Feess and Walzl (2004), and Gromb and Martimort (2007) are
concerned with other issues. But in their models, the agent can in any case choose be-
tween only two decisions, which limits the scope for answering the question because
marginal adjustments in riskiness are in general not possible. Biais and Casamatta
(1999) and Feess and Walzl (2004), moreover, consider no more than three levels of
return to the principal on which payment to the agent can be based, so the same in-
centives can be achieved by different forms of contract.
The most general of these formulations is in Diamond (1998). In that paper, there
are only a ﬁnite number of possible levels of gross return to the principal, but a con-
tinuum of decisions that vary the probabilities of these returns. For this structure,
Diamond (1998) establishes the “near-linearity” result that, when a linear contract is
the only form of contract that induces the agent to make efﬁcient decisions, an opti-
mal contract converges to a linear contract as the ratio of the principal’s gross return
to the agent’s cost of taking appropriate action increases. The intuition is that a linear
1Malcomson (2009) considers a risk-averse agent and the literature for that case. Innes (1990) analy-
ses the classic principal-agent problem with no additional decision but with the restrictions that the
rewards to both agent and principal are monotone in the outcome. Such monotonicity restrictions arise
naturally in some cases in which the agent’s action generates private information that is used subse-
quently in making a decision, though Innes (1990) does not derive them in that way.
2contract always induces the agent to make efﬁcient decisions. When it is the only form
that does so, it is natural that the optimal contract converges to linear when the cost of
inducing action is small relative to the principal’s concern with making efﬁcient deci-
sions. Diamond (1998) does not, however, consider the effect of limited liability on the
riskiness of the agent’s decisions.
The present paper derives results on this issue that do not depend on an unsub-
stantiated “ﬁrst-order approach”. It does so, moreover, with a continuum of possi-
ble decisions and a continuum of possible outcomes. Speciﬁcally, the manager-agent
makes a decision that can be either successful, with known positive return, or unsuc-
cessful with zero return. An example is the price to bid to supply a good or service; a
successful bid yields a return equal to the price less the cost of supply, an unsuccessful
bid a return of zero. The manager’s action reveals information about the probability
that different decisions will be successful. There is a continuum of possible decisions,
each with a different return if successful, and thus a continuum of possible returns.
As a result, the manager can always make marginally more or less risky decisions. To
anticipate the conclusion, when the manager takes costly action to acquire information
before making a decision, limited liability may result in either a more risky or a less
risky decision than the risk-neutral principal would choose given the same informa-
tion. The analysis gives precise conditions under which each occurs. When limited
liability results in less risky decisions, managers are induced to make decisions in a
way that makes it look as if they are risk-averse — limited liability not only reduces
the proﬁts of ﬁrms but also biases their decisions in a risk-averse direction.
The model also provides insights into when the “near-linearity” result of Diamond
(1998) fails to hold. An example is when it is crucial for the principal to ensure that
the decision results in a successful outcome (because, say, the future of the company
depends on winning a contract). The principal then wants the manager to make the
decision with the highest return that the manager knows will be successful given the
information available. In that case, any contract with payment non-decreasing in the
return will induce the manager not to make a decision with return lower than is op-
timal. That results in sufﬁcient ﬂexibility for a linear contract not to be the only form
that induces the agent to make efﬁcient decisions. This case is sufﬁciently straight-
forward to solve explicitly for an optimal contract. A linear contract turns out not
to be optimal because other contracts ensure efﬁcient decisions at lower cost to the
principal. Moreover, an optimal contract is not a debt contract, as derived by Innes
(1990) when rewards to both principal and agent are assumed to be monotone. Nor
is it a combination of debt, equity and share options that Biais and Casamatta (1999)
found optimal with just two possible decisions and three possible levels of return to
the principal.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 devel-
ops the example of bidding to supply a good or service. Section 4 speciﬁes formally
3the principal’s optimal contracting problem. Section 5 analyses the agent’s decisions
under an optimal contract. Section 6 considers the form an optimal contract takes.
Section 7 concludes. Proofs of propositions are in an appendix.
2 The model
A risk-neutral principal (owner) employs an agent (manager) to make a decision. Each
possible decision has one of two outcomes, failure with return zero, or success with




, with b ﬁnite. Of the possible decisions, there
is just one that, if successful, yields return b. Decisions can, therefore, be labelled by
their return if successful. By taking action a 2 fa,ag before making the decision, the
agent acquires, with probability density f (s;a), a signal s 2 [s,s] about the probability
p (b;s) that the decision b will be successful. The action has a direct utility cost to
the agent, the decision does not. In this respect the environment, like those in the
papers cited in the Introduction, differs from the multi-task agency environment of
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). Without loss of generality, signals can be ordered
so that the likelihood ratio LR(s) ￿ f (s;a)/f (s;a) is non-increasing in s. A higher
signal is then relatively more likely to have arisen from a than from a. By itself, this
has no economic implications. Only when combined with a decision rule b(s) that
speciﬁes the decision as a function of s does it have implications for the likelihood
ratio of a decision arising from action a rather than a. The principal observes only the
return, not the decision and the action taken by the agent.
A number of different economic interpretations can be placed on this structure.
The decision b may be the amount to bid to supply a good or service to a purchaser
whose reservation value is unknown. If the bid is successful, the return is b (measured
net of the cost of supply). If it is unsuccessful, the return is zero. The signal is then
information about the purchaser’s reservation value. This interpretation is developed
further in an example below. Alternatively the decision may be which of a set of
mutually exclusive projects to undertake. The returns b (in the case of success) and
zero (in the case of failure) are then measured gross of the investment in the project.
The agent is risk-neutral but has limited liability that rules out payments from the
principal of less than P. As conventional in principal-agent models, the agent’s utility
function is additively separable in income and action, so the agent’s utility from being
paid P and taking action a can be written P ￿ v(a), where v(a) is the disutility of tak-
ing action a and v(a) > v(a). The agent’s reservation utility for accepting a contract
with the principal is U.
It is natural to assume p (b;s) is non-increasing in b for given s — a lower bid,
for example, is at least as likely to be accepted by the purchaser as a higher one. The
return from the decision b = 0 is the same whether or not it is successful, so effectively
p (0;s) = 1. It is convenient to assume that p (b;s) is strictly decreasing in b where
4feasible (that is, pb (b;s) ￿ ¶p (b;s)/¶b < 0 for all (b,s) such that p (b;s) > 0), twice
differentiable with respect to b and s except possibly for p (b;s) = 0 and p (b;s) = 1
and, to avoid trivial decisions, has the property that for each s 2 [s,s] there exists some
b 2 (0,b] for which p (b;s) > 0. A useful benchmark is an efﬁcient decision rule b￿ (.)
the principal would use if receiving the signal s directly. Such a rule satisﬁes
b￿ (s) 2 arg max
b2[0,b]
bp (b;s), for all s 2 [s,s]. (1)
The sequence of events is as follows. As in the classic principal-agent model, the
principal makes a “take it or leave it” offer of a contract to the agent. If accepted, the
agent chooses an action a, receives a signal s, and makes a decision b, in that order.
The return from the decision is then realised and the agent is paid according to the
contract. The essential difference from the classic principal-agent model is that the
signal received by the agent is not itself veriﬁable. If it were, the incentive issues here
would reduce to those of the classic model.
The assumption that the principal does not observe the decision itself, only the
return from it, has the implication that payment to the agent cannot be conditioned
explicitly on the decision. That follows the motivating literature discussed in the In-
troduction. It may, of course, not be appropriate for some applications in which the
decision itself is observable whatever the outcome. But some care is needed in deter-
mining when the decision is actually observable in a way that is useful for payment.
In the bidding interpretation, for example, the return corresponds to an accounting
transaction. An unsuccessful bid does not and one can imagine collusion between the
purchaser and the agent about the level of a losing bid becoming a signiﬁcant issue if
payment to the agent depended on it. Moreover, in the present context, knowing the
decision corresponds to knowing the distribution of returns given any signal. A char-
acteristic of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis is that some senior bank executives appeared to
have no idea what distribution of returns their subordinates were choosing when, for
example, buying such ﬁnancial instruments as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).
Many such instruments are highly complex, so the correspondence between observ-
able choices and probability distributions may not be at all apparent.
The assumption that there are only two possible outcomes from each decision, one
of which is the same for all decisions, is essentially for analytical tractability. The role
of the assumption is to give a direct link between the decision and the return so that
changing the payment for return b affects only the payoff from making decision b,
not that from making any other decision. But that also helps greatly in sharpening
the intuition underlying the results. It is, moreover, entirely natural in the context of
bidding, where the agent either wins, with the return corresponding to the bid, or




to tender a bid to supply a good or service to a buyer whose reservation value is un-




, with q > 0, be the buyer’s privately known valuation of the
good or service, with density function h(q) capturing the principal’s and agent’s com-
mon beliefs about q. By taking action a 2 fa,ag, with v(a) < v(a), the agent ac-
quires with probability r(a), with r(a) > r(a), information about the buyer’s reser-
vation value and thus about the optimal price to bid. That information corresponds
to the signal s 2 (s,s], with density function denoted x (s;q) conditional on informa-
tion being acquired. It might, for example, be that s is the price the buyer paid for a
complementary good. With probability 1 ￿ r(a), the agent acquires no information,
corresponding to s. The price to bid corresponds to the decision b.
The buyer accepts the bid b if q ￿ b. The probability of acceptance given action a
and signal s 2 (s,s], which corresponds to p (b,s) in the general model, is






It might be that s is the price the buyer paid for a complementary good, in which
case one might expect the probability of a given bid being accepted to increase with
s (¶p (b,s)/¶s > 0) and the rate at which that probability declines with the bid to
decrease (¶2p (b,s)/¶b¶s > 0). For simplicity, let the cost of supply be zero so that b is
the return to the principal from a successful bid. The return from an unsuccessful bid
is 0. In this example,
f (s;a) = r(a)
Z q
0
x (s;q)h(q)dq, for s 2 (s,s],a 2 fa,ag, (3)
f (s;a) = 1￿ r(a), for a 2 fa,ag,
so LR(s) is non-increasing in s, as assumed.







, for b < q,s 2 (s,s]. (4)
To illustrate the possibilities, suppose ﬁrst that 1/s is an upper bound on the true
value of q, that is, 1/s ￿ q or s ￿ 1/q. Then a higher s provides more information and
x (s;q) = 0 for s > 1/q. In this case, a bid b > 1/s is not optimal because it will be













Use of this in (4) gives that pb (b,s)/p (b,s) is strictly decreasing in s for b < 1/s. As
an alternative, suppose that s is a lower bound on the true value of q, that is, s ￿ q.
Then a higher s provides more information and x (s;q) = 0 for s > q. In this case,
a bid b < s is not optimal because there is always a slightly higher bid that will be
accepted with probability 1. The uniform distribution is slightly awkward in this case





2, s 2 (q,q];
0, otherwise.
Use of this in (4) gives that pb (b,s)/p (b,s) is strictly increasing in s for b > s. Thus
each effect is plausible under some circumstances.
4 Contracts between principal and agent
A contract between principal and agent speciﬁes the payment P(.) to the agent as a
function of the return to the principal. (The contract could specify a lottery conditional
on b but, since both parties are risk neutral, that would have no advantage over a de-
terministic payment equal to the expected value.) The agent’s limited liability requires




. For decision b, the return is b if the outcome is suc-
cessful and 0 if it is not. Thus, an agent facing contract P(.) who receives signal s and
makes decision b has expected monetary compensation
u(b,s,P(.)) ￿ P(b)p (b;s) + P(0)[1￿ p (b;s)], for all s 2 [s,s]. (5)
The agent’s expected utility before the signal s is known from adopting the decision




u(b(s),s,P(.)) f (s;a)ds ￿ v(a). (6)
The principal’s expected payoff from decision b given signal s and contract P(.) is
r(b,s,P(.)) ￿ [b ￿ P(b)]p (b;s) ￿ P(0)[1￿ p (b;s)], for all s 2 [s,s], (7)




r(b(s),s,P(.)) f (s;a)ds. (8)
An optimal contract maximises the principal’s payoff subject to feasibility, individ-
ual rationality and incentive compatibility for the agent. The optimal contract problem
can be written in the way standard with principal-agent problems as
max
a,b(.),P(.)
R(a,b(.),P(.)) subject to (9)
U (a,b(.),P(.)) ￿ U; (10)







b(s) 2 arg max
b2[0,b]
u(b,s,P(.)) for all s 2 [s,s]; (12)





Constraint (10) is the individual rationality condition that the agent has expected util-
ity from the decision rule b(.) when choosing action a under contract P(.) no lower
than from declining the contract. Constraint (11) ensures that the agent receives at
least as much expected utility from choosing action a as from choosing any other ac-
tion. Constraint (12) ensures that the decision rule b(.) maximises the agent’s payoff
for each s. (Writing the constraints this way implicitly assumes that an agent who is
indifferent between two values of a or b chooses that preferred by the principal. Mixed
strategies could be handled at the cost of complicating the presentation.) Finally, con-
straint (13) ensures the contract respects the agent’s limited liability.
Proposition 1 The following properties apply to the principal’s problem (9)–(13).
1. There is no loss to the principal from using a contract with payment non-decreasing in
the return.
2. An efﬁcient decision rule b￿ (.) can be implemented by a contract P(.) of the form
P(b) = u + kb, for all b 2 [0,b], for any constant k ￿ 0, (14)
for constant u such that, given k, the contract satisﬁes both the agent’s individual ratio-
nality constraint (10) for some a 2 fa,ag and the limited liability constraint (13).
The ﬁrst property in Proposition 1 arises because the agent will never make de-
cision b(s) if there is some decision b < b(s) for which the successful outcome has
payment P(b) > P(b(s)) given that b has probability of success no lower than b(s).
The possibility of the agent making a decision conditional on the outcome of the ac-
tion thus provides a reason for contracts to be monotone in practice in addition to
8those discussed in the literature, see Hart and Holmström (1987). In particular, it does
not depend on a Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) assumption with gen-
uine economic implications — the MLRP assumption on LR(s) here amounts purely
to a labelling. The second property holds because, using the linear contract (14) in (5)
ensures (12) has the same set of maximizers as (1). For k = 0, the agent is indifferent to
the choice of b but, in that case, has been assumed to do whatever the principal would
prefer. With k = 0, of course, the agent has no incentive to take the costly action a. But
if it is optimal for the principal to induce the agent to take action a, a contract of the
form in (14) with k = 0 and u satisfying (10) and (13), one of them with equality, is op-
timal. The discussion that follows, therefore, considers the case in which it is optimal
for the principal to induce the agent to choose action a.
5 Optimal decision rules
If limited liability were not binding, it would be optimal for the principal to use a
contract of the form in (14) with k = 1, which corresponds to the principal selling
the project to the agent at a ﬁxed price and the agent receiving all the return from it.
The agent would then select b￿ (s) given s, so b￿ (s) is an appropriate benchmark for
an agent without limited liability. This section explores the decision rule it is optimal
for the principal to induce the agent to adopt when limited liability is binding. The
assumption used for this is the following.
Assumption 1 p (b;s) satisﬁes the following:








= 0, for all s 2 [s,s];
2. pb (b;s)/p (b;s) is continuous non-increasing in b for all b 2 [0,b) and s 2 [s,s];
3. pb (b;s)/p (b;s) is either strictly increasing or strictly decreasing in s for all b 2 ￿
0,b
￿
and s 2 [s,s].
This assumption guarantees pb (b;s) < 0 for all s and b < b. The assumption in
Part 1 that decision b has zero probability of success is not restrictive — in practice that
will be the case for b set sufﬁciently high. More restrictive is the implication that the
probability of success becomes zero at the same b for all s. That can be avoided but
at the cost of complicating the proofs. The assumption in Part 2 is common to many
standard distributions. The bidding example of Section 3 illustrates that either case in
Part 3 can hold. The economic implications are discussed further later.
The following proposition establishes that there is a unique efﬁcient decision rule
under Assumption 1 and speciﬁes some of its characteristics.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1:




for all s 2 [s,s];
2. b￿ (s) is the unique solution to the ﬁrst-order condition
b￿ (s)pb (b￿ (s);s) + p (b￿ (s);s) = 0, for all s 2 [s,s]; (15)
3. b￿ (s) is strictly increasing (decreasing) if pb (b;s)/p (b;s) is strictly increasing (de-




and s 2 [s,s].
Part 3 of this result can be illustrated with the bidding example from Section 3. The
case there with pb (b;s)/p (b;s) strictly increasing in s has s as a lower bound on the
true reservation price of the purchaser. In that case, higher s makes a higher bid more
desirable, so b￿ (s) is increasing in s. The case with pb (b;s)/p (b;s) strictly decreasing
in s has 1/s as an upper bound on the true reservation price of the purchaser. Then a
higher s makes a lower bid more desirable, so b￿ (s) is decreasing in s. In both cases,
having a higher s is information valuable to the principal, so action to increase the
probability of higher s is also valuable.
The next proposition gives results on implementing decision rules that are helpful
for characterising an optimal contract. By Proposition 1, the principal need consider




and hence differentiable almost every-
where. To simplify the analysis, attention is restricted to contracts that are differen-
tiable everywhere.
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumption 1 holds.





and P(b(s)) > P(b) for all b < b(s).
2. Necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for a contract P(.) accepted by the agent to imple-




for all s 2 [s,s] are that b(s):
(a) satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition
P0 (b(s))p (b(s);s)+[P(b(s)) ￿ P(0)]pb (b(s);s) = 0, for all s 2 [s,s], (16)
and (b) is non-decreasing (non-increasing) if pb (b;s)/p (b;s) is strictly increasing




and s 2 [s,s].2
3. A necessary condition for the agent to make an efﬁcient decision b￿ (s) for all s 2 [s,s]
is that P(.) satisﬁes
P(b) = P(0) + kb, for all b 2 [b￿ (s),b￿ (s)], with k > 0. (17)
2This result also holds if “non-decreasing” and “non-increasing” are replaced by “strictly increas-
ing” and “strictly decreasing” respectively because b0 (s) = 0 is in fact inconsistent with the ﬁrst-order
condition (16) holding for all s. The result is stated as in Proposition 3 because it is more convenient
later to work with a weak, rather than a strict, inequality.
10Part 1 of Proposition 3 establishes that only decision rules with decisions interior to ￿
0,b
￿
can be implemented and they require contracts with payment increasing with
b. Part 2 establishes conditions under which the ﬁrst-order condition for the agent’s
decision is sufﬁcient, as well as necessary, for an optimum conditional on s so that one
can adopt a “ﬁrst-order approach” — the requirement that the agent’s decision must
be optimal can be characterised by the ﬁrst-order condition for optimality. The under-
lying idea is the same as in the application of the “ﬁrst-order approach” in Rogerson
(1985) and Jewitt (1988) but there the application is to the agent’s choice of action, not
the agent’s decision based on a signal that results from that action. The proof makes
use of the property that the agent’s ﬁrst-order condition must hold for all s. This im-
poses restrictions on how the agent’s expected utility varies with s, which in turn im-
poses restrictions on b(.) that turn out to be sufﬁcient as well as necessary. Speciﬁcally,
b(.) must be non-decreasing or non-increasing according to whether pb (b;s)/p (b;s)
is increasing or decreasing in s, a property of the exogenously given probability dis-
tribution. Thus, for a probability distribution with the appropriate property, the only
constraint other than the ﬁrst-order condition that needs to be applied to ensure incen-
tive compatibility is one on the direction that b(s) changes with s. This is a standard,
and straightforward, constraint to impose. Part 3 of Proposition 3 establishes that a
contract linear in the return b is not only sufﬁcient to induce the agent to adopt b￿ (.)
but also necessary when Assumption 1 holds.
Proposition 3 speciﬁes properties of the decision rules it is feasible for the principal
to induce the agent to use and of the contracts required to do so. The next proposition
concerns the properties of the decision rules it is optimal for the principal to induce.
With a risk-neutral agent, the only reason to distort the agent’s decision away from
what is efﬁcient is to reduce the effect of limited liability. In general, it is not obvious
what direction that distortion takes. The next result shows that it can be towards either
more risky decisions or less risky decisions.
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumption 1 holds.3 Then, if limited liability is binding under an
optimal contract, that contract implements:
1. b(s) > b￿ (s) for all s 2 (s,s), b(s) = b￿ (s) and b(s) ￿ b￿ (s) if pb (b;s)/p (b;s)




and s 2 [s,s];
2. b(s) < b￿ (s) for all s 2 (s,s), b(s) = b￿ (s) and b(s) ￿ b￿ (s) if pb (b;s)/p (b;s)




and s 2 [s,s].
Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figure 1. From Proposition 3, only a contract linear
in b with positive slope induces the agent both to take action a and to select decision
b￿ (s) for all s. Let ˆ P(b) in the ﬁgure illustrate the linear contract with the least steep
3An appropriate constraint qualiﬁcation for the optimal control problem of choosing b(.) is also
assumed to be satisﬁed, see Lemma 2 in the appendix.








Figure 1: Illustration of Proposition 4
slope that, in the absence of limited liability, would satisfy the incentive compatibility
constraint for the agent to choose action a and also, with equality, the individual ratio-
nality constraint. Binding limited liability implies P > ˆ P(0). One possible response
of the principal would be to continue to implement b￿ (s) for all s by using a linear
contract with the same slope but with P(0) increased to P. That corresponds to the
dotted line in Figure 1. The incentive compatibility condition corresponding to (11)








[P(b(s)) ￿ P(0)]p (b(s);s) f (s;a)ds ￿ v(a), (18)
so adding the same constant to P(b) for all b leaves it still satisﬁed. But the expected
payment to the agent is given by the left-hand side of (18), so adding a positive con-
stant involves paying the agent more than required to satisfy the individual rationality
constraint. However, with the deﬁnition LR(s) ￿ f (s;a)/f (s;a), (18) can, when lim-
ited liability binds so that P(0) = P, be written
Z ¯ s
s
[P(b(s)) ￿ P]p (b(s);s) f (s;a)[1￿ LR(s)]ds ￿ v(a) ￿ v(a). (19)
12Thus the expected payment to the agent can be reduced while still satisfying (19) by
reducing payments that are above P for returns b(s) for s such that the likelihood
ratio LR(s) is greater than 1. Since s is ordered so that LR(s) is non-increasing, that
corresponds to reducing payments for returns b(s) for low s.
For Part 1 of Proposition 4, pb (b;s)/p (b;s) is strictly increasing in s. By Proposi-
tion 2, b￿ (s) is then strictly increasing, so reducing payments for returns b(s) for low
s corresponds to reducing payments for low returns. Because that increases the left-
hand side of (19), it enables payments to be reduced for b(s) for s such that LR(s) < 1
too but never such as to make the contract concave because then a less steep linear
contract would also have satisﬁed the constraint. Suppose the optimal contract cor-
responds to P￿ (b) in Figure 1. The effect on the decision for given s can be seen
from the agent’s ﬁrst-order condition (16) which, with binding limited liability (and








Consider the return ˆ b in Figure 1 at which the dashed line has a steeper slope than
the dotted line and let s0 and s00 denote the values of s for which ˆ b is chosen under
the contracts represented by the dashed and the dotted lines respectively. At ˆ b, the
denominator on the right hand side of (20) is smaller for the contract represented by


















When pb (b;s)/p (b;s) is strictly increasing in s, that implies s0 < s00. Moreover, with
b(s) and b￿ (s) both increasing and ˆ b = b(s0) = b￿ (s00), it follows that b(s00) > b￿ (s00).
That conclusion applies for pb (b;s)/p (b;s) strictly increasing in s as in Part 1 of
Proposition 4. For pb (b;s)/p (b;s) strictly decreasing in s as in Part 2, b(s00) < b￿ (s00).
The proof of Proposition 4 establishes that these conclusions apply for all s 2 (s,s).
In both cases, the response to limited liability is to reduce the payment for returns
b(s) for those s for which LR(s) is greater than 1. The difference between them is the
effect that has on the decision rule. For b￿ (s) increasing, higher b is more attractive to
the principal for higher s and, by deﬁnition, LR(s) is lower for higher s. So reducing
payments for returns with higher LR(s) reduces payments for lower b, making higher,
more risky, decisions more attractive to the agent and thus b(s) > b￿ (s). The opposite
applies for b￿ (s) decreasing. The conclusion that the direction of the distortion from
efﬁciency can go either way mirrors that in Palomino and Prat (2003) in their appli-
cation to delegated portfolio choice. Their result, however, relies on the “ﬁrst-order
approach” being valid, which they cannot guarantee. For the model used here, it has
13been established that the ﬁrst-order approach is indeed valid.
The essential point here is the following. Start from a linear contract that respects
limited liability and provides sufﬁcient incentive for action a. The principal can reduce
the total expected payment to the agent and still achieve the same incentive for action
by reducing payments for returns to decisions that are made for signals that are more
likely to arise from a than from a. Given the ordering of signals, these are lower sig-
nals. If less risky decisions (lower b) are relatively more attractive to the principal for
low signals, this will induce the agent to make more risky decisions than under a lin-
ear contract. If, on the other hand, more risky decisions (higher b) are relatively more
attractive to the principal for low signals, it will induce the agent to make less risky
decisions than under a linear contract. Since the linear contract induces efﬁcient deci-
sions, small changes in decisions involve little efﬁciency loss, so some deviation of this
sort is always worthwhile in order to reduce the total expected payment to the agent.
This general insight seems robust. The precise conditions in Assumption 1 ensure that
(1) a linear contract is the only starting point for efﬁcient decisions and (2) efﬁcient
decisions are always interior so that small deviations from them always involve only
small efﬁciency losses. The assumption that there are only two possible outcomes for
each decision, one of which is the same for all decisions, makes it straightforward to
identify how the riskiness of decisions changes with the signal.
Under the conditions of Part 2 of Proposition 4, the agent is induced, for all values
of the information signal apart from those at the two extremes of its support, to make
a less risky decision, with a lower return and a higher probability of success, than
the principal would choose given the same information. Thus the principal chooses
a contract that more than compensates for the incentive an agent otherwise has to
make a more risky decision if limited liability is imposed on a contract that would be
optimal in the absence of limited liability. In that case, managers with limited liability
are induced to take decisions in a way that makes it look as if they are risk-averse —
limited liability not only reduces the proﬁts of ﬁrms but also biases their decisions in
a less risky direction.
6 Optimal contract form
Proposition 3 implies that, when Assumption 1 holds, only a contract with payment
linear in the return induces the agent to select b￿ (s) for all s, a condition under which
Diamond (1998) establishes the “near-linearity” result described in the Introduction.
But Diamond (1998) recognises that this is not always the case. This section uses an
example of the model of Section 2 to give some insight into when it is not.
The model in Diamond (1998) is similar to that used here in having the agent make
a decision that affects the probabilities of the possible outcomes. It differs in having
only a ﬁnite number of possible outcomes, with the possible outcomes resulting from
14a decision not restricted to just two. (It also differs in that it is not possible for the
agent to inﬂuence the probabilities of the outcomes without ﬁrst taking a costly action
but that difference is not important here.) The “near-linearity” result can be stated as
follows. Let c = v(a) ￿ v(a) and express the returns from decision b, if successful,
as lb for l > 0, with the probability of success being unaffected by the value of l.
Then, when the only contracts that induce the agent to select an efﬁcient decision rule
are linear, an optimal contract converges to a linear contract as c/l converges to zero.
The essential intuition is that, as l gets large relative to c, the gain to the principal from
decisions being efﬁcient dwarfs the additional cost of inducing the agent to take action
a with a linear contract than with some other contract.
To illustrate why the same conclusion does not necessarily apply when contracts
that are not linear induce efﬁcient decisions, consider a principal who wants to ensure
that the agent’s decision has a successful outcome with a return no less than is nec-
essary to achieve this. That is plausible in some circumstances. Winning a particular
contract may be crucial to the survival of a ﬁrm, the situation of Rolls-Royce with its
RB211 jet engines in the 1970s. Of course, that is possible only when some decision
has a certainly successful outcome given the information available. The following as-
sumption formalizes these properties.
Assumption 2 For each s 2 [s,s], there exists b 2 (b,b] such that p (b;s) = 1. The







j p (b;s) = 1
o
forall s 2 [s,s]. Forsufﬁcientlysmall # > 0, p (b(s) + #;s) 2
(0,1) for all s 2 [s,s).
The reason for the ﬁnal part of Assumption 2 is that, if p (b(s) + #;s) = 0 for all
s 2 [s,s), the agent’s signal would fully reveal which decisions would have successful
outcomes whatever the agent’s action, so there would be no reason for wanting the
agenttochoose a ratherthan a. ForanexampleofadistributionsatisfyingAssumption
2, let b0 denote the decision with the highest return that will actually be successful and
suppose f (s;a) has support [ab0,b0] for a 2 fa,ag with 0 < a < a < 1. Then the signal
s is a random draw from a distribution with both lower and upper supports no greater
than b0 and the decision b = s will thus certainly have a successful outcome. Moreover,
higher a results in a signal s drawn from a distribution concentrated closer to b0 and, as
a approaches one, s corresponds to b0. This is illustrated for the case of f (s;a) uniform
in Figure 2. Under straightforward conditions, b = s is also an efﬁcient decision. Let
pb+(b;s) denote the right-hand derivative at p (b;s) = 1. Then if
spb+(s;s) + 1 < 0,
or equivalently pb+(b;s) < ￿1/s, the decision b = s is a local optimum for the max-
imand in (1). Under straightforward conditions, it is also a global optimum. Then
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Figure 2: Example of f(s;a) for case of certain success
b￿ (s) = s, so an efﬁcient decision rule ensures that the decision always has a success-
ful outcome.
By Proposition 1, contracts can be restricted to those that are non-decreasing. Then
limited liability binds for P(0) and, if satisﬁed by P(0), is satisﬁed for all b > 0. Thus,
the condition corresponding to (12) for the agent to choose b(s) given signal s is
b(s) 2 arg max
b2[0,b]
P(b)p (b;s) + P[1￿ p (b;s)], for all s 2 [s,s]. (22)
UnderAssumption2, with b(.) suchthat p (b(s);s) = 1forall s andhence p (b;s) = 1
for all b < b(s), this condition is automatically satisﬁed for all b ￿ b(s) if P(.) is non-
decreasing. The following result is concerned with b > b(s).
Proposition 5 Suppose Assumption 2 holds. A necessary condition for contract P(.) to im-
plement b(.) is that
P0 (b(s)) ￿ ￿pb+(b(s);s)[P(b(s)) ￿ P], for all s 2 [s,s]. (23)
For P(.) non-decreasing, this condition is also sufﬁcient if b(s) and pb (b;s)/p (b;s) are




and s 2 [s,s].
The implication of (23) is that, to ensure the agent makes a decision with an out-
come that is always successful, P(.) must not only not decrease but also not increase
16too fast. If it does, the agent’s payoff is increased by choosing a slightly higher b, with
a higher reward if successful but with a probability of success strictly less than one.
Suppose the constraint (23) is not binding. Then limited liability reduces the prin-
cipal’s payoff only because it is not possible to satisfy the incentive compatibility con-
dition (11) for the agent to choose action a while satisfying the agent’s individual ratio-
nality condition (10) with equality. The incentive compatibility condition (11) in this
case can be written in a form similar to (19) that, when binding, becomes
Z ¯ s
s
P(b(s)) f (s;a)[1￿ LR(s)]ds = v(a) ￿ v(a). (24)
As discussed in connection with Proposition 4, the expected payment to the agent can
be reduced while keeping the incentive compatibility condition (24) satisﬁed by re-
allocating rewards from b(s) for s such that LR(s) is high to b(s) for s such that LR(s)
islow. Since s isorderedsothat LR(.) isnon-increasing, thatcorrespondstoincreasing
the payments for low b if b(.) is decreasing and for high b if b(.) is increasing. In the
former case, the principal would wish to focus all payments above P on the lowest b
to be chosen for any s, but that would clearly not satisfy P(.) non-decreasing. In the
latter case, the principal would wish to focus payments above P on the highest b to
be chosen for any s, but that would necessarily violate the constraint (23) that P(.)
not increase too fast. The following result applies to the case b(.) everywhere strictly
increasing so the inverse function b￿1 (.) exists.
Proposition 6 Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Then the following form of contract is optimal if










P, for b 2 [0,b(s)],










, for b 2 [b(s),b(s)],






with P(b(s)) ensuring that the incentive compatibility condition (24) is satisﬁed.
Proposition 6 gives the formula for an optimal contract under the conditions speci-
ﬁed. Everything in that formula is data for the model apart from P(b(s)), which is set
so that the incentive compatibility condition (24) is satisﬁed when the formula in (25)
is substituted for P(b). The formula is linear in the exponential term and so will not, in





P(b) would be exponentially increasing in b. Note that the middle line in (25) ap-




approaches zero (because then the exponential
term approaches one), in which case the contract approaches one with provision for
just two levels of payment, P and P(b(s)), the former of which is never actually paid
17because it applies only to returns that do not occur. That is like a ﬁxed salary P(b(s)),
with P corresponding to the threat of being ﬁred for a return so low that it cannot oc-





= 0, it would not be optimal for the principal to implement b(.) be-
cause it would always be proﬁtable to accept a small risk of an unsuccessful outcome
in order to relax the limited liability constraint.
Proposition 6 illustrates that the “near-linearity” result of Diamond (1998) may not
hold when a non-linear contract can induce the agent to select an efﬁcient decision
rule. That proposition applies to any b(.) that satisﬁes Assumption 2 and, hence, an
efﬁcient decision rule b￿ (.) when that does so. Then, although a linear contract would
implement b￿ (.), the non-differentiability of the probability p (b,s) for b = b￿ (s) gives
sufﬁcient ﬂexibility for a linear contract not to be the only contract that induces the
agent to choose b￿ (.). Moreover, the non-linear contract in (25) does that at lower
cost to the principal, no matter what the magnitude of the agent’s disutility of action a
(conditional, of course, on it being worthwhile to induce the agent to take that action).
It is also instructive to compare the result in Proposition 6 with results in two pa-
pers in which optimal contract forms are derived explicitly for a risk-neutral agent
with limited liability, Innes (1990), and Biais and Casamatta (1999). Innes (1990, Propo-
sition 1) considers a classic principal-agent model (corresponding to the signal s be-
ing veriﬁable and, hence, b(.) being contractible) with the additional assumption that
both the principal’s and the agent’s rewards are monotonic in the return. Under as-
sumptions corresponding to b(.) increasing, as in Proposition 6, he shows that a debt
contract is optimal. With limited liability, a debt contract has P(b) = P (and hence
P0 (b) = 0) for b < ˆ b and P0 (b) = 1 for b > ˆ b for some ˆ b. The contract in (25) clearly
does not correspond to that. The reason for the difference lies in the nature of the con-
straint on how fast P(.) can increase. A contract monotonic for the principal implies
that the reward to the agent cannot increase faster than the realised return, that is,
P0 (.) ￿ 1. Thus in Innes (1990) the constraint P0 (.) ￿ 1 replaces the constraint (23). As
discussed above, with LR(.) non-increasing, payment to the agent is reduced while
maintaining incentives for action by transferring rewards from lower values of b to
higher values, which results in the constraint P0 (.) ￿ 1 becoming binding. As long as
limited liability is not so tight as to make that constraint bind for all b, a debt contract,
with a ﬂat section for low b, is optimal. Thus, although the contracts differ, the un-
derlying rationale for a debt contract in Innes (1990) is similar to that for the contract
in Proposition 6. The difference is that the constraint (23) is not an assumption but is
derived from the need to make the decision rule incentive compatible for the agent.
In Biais and Casamatta (1999), there is only a single decision that is ever worth-
while to the principal, no matter what signal the agent receives. Thus there is no issue
of trading off a different decision for a lower expected payment to the agent. They
show that an optimal contract can be implemented in terms of three instruments, debt,
18equity and share options. Thus their result, like that in Proposition 6, serves to empha-
size that a debt contract is not in general optimal when a risk-neutral agent makes a
decision as well as choosing how hard to work at acquiring information. But with only
three possible outcomes in their model, it is not surprising that just three instruments
can implement an optimal contract. It remains to be seen what standard instruments
(if any) can do so when, as in the model studied here, the optimal decision for the
principal depends on the signal privately received and there is a continuum of possi-
ble outcomes.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper has been concerned with whether, when taking costly action to acquire
information before making decisions, a risk-neutral manager with limited liability
makes more risky or less risky decisions than one without limited liability when oper-
ating under an optimal contract with a principal. The answer depends on the nature of
the environment. The manager’s limited liability restricts the incentives for action that
can be attained at given expected cost to the principal. As a result, the principal wants
to place greater reward on those outcomes that have higher likelihood of arising from
the action the principal wishes the manager to take. In the notation used here, that
corresponds to rewarding the agent more for signals s for which the likelihood ratio
LR(s) (￿ f (s;a)/f (s;a)) is low. The resulting decisions will be more risky if those
signals are ones for which the principal wants the agent to take more risky decisions
and less risky otherwise.
A contract in which the reward to the manager is non-decreasing and linear in the
return to the manager’s decision will always induce the manager to adopt an efﬁcient
decision rule. Diamond (1998) establishes the “near-linearity” result that, if such a lin-
ear contract is the only form that does this, an optimal contract converges to a linear
contract as the ratio of the principal’s gross return to the agent’s cost of taking ap-
propriate action increases. The present paper gives an insight into when that result
does not apply. In the model used here, the non-decreasing property of the contract
still holds — there is always an optimal contract that is non-decreasing. That result
does not depend on the likelihood ratio LR(.) being monotone. It arises because a
decreasing contract gives the manager an incentive to make decisions that effectively
“throw away” returns. The fact that the manager makes a decision, as well as taking
an action, thus provides a reason for contracts to be monotone in practice additional
to those discussed in the earlier literature. But in an example in which efﬁcient deci-
sions occur where the probability of success has corners (and so is non-differentiable),
the optimal contract is not linear and does not converge to a linear contract no matter
what the agent’s cost of action, so the "near-linearity" result of Diamond (1998) does
not apply. The non-differentiability gives sufﬁcient ﬂexibility for a non-linear contract
19to induce the agent to adopt an efﬁcient decision rule and does so at a lower expected
cost to the principal.
Appendix Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Part 1. Suppose P(.) implements decision rule b(.) with
P(b0) > P(b(s)) for some b0 < b(s) for some s. By (5), the agent’s payoff from
choosing b(s) conditional on s is
u(b(s),s,P(.)) = P(b(s))p (b(s);s) + P(0)[1￿ p (b(s);s)].
If p (b(s);s) = 0, the return to the principal is the same as if the agent had chosen
b = 0, so there is no loss to the principal from implementing b = 0 instead of b(s). If
p (b(s);s) > 0, it must be that P(b(s)) ￿ P(0) because otherwise the agent would
achieve a higher payoff from choosing b = 0. The agent’s payoff from choosing b0



















But this is greater than u(b(s),s,P(.)) for P(b0) > P(b(s)) because p (b;s) is non-
increasing in b, contradicting that P(.) implements b(.). So it must be that P(b(s)) ￿
P(b) for all b < b(s) for all s.
Now consider b that is not to be implemented for any s. If there exists b(s) < b
for some s, let ˆ b(b) = maxb(s) over s such that b(s) < b. If not, let ˆ b(b) = 0. The




even though b > ˆ b(b). But, as









￿ p (b;s). Since b is never chosen if b(s) is implemented, P(b)
does not affect the agent’s incentive for action or the principal’s payoff. Thus the




. But then the contract is non-
decreasing.
Part 2. Use of P(.) from (14) in (5) and the resulting expression for u(b,s,P(.)) in
(12) gives
b(s) 2 arg max
b2[0,b]
[u + kbp (b;s)], for all s 2 [s,s],
which for k ￿ 0 deﬁnes the same set of maximizers as (1).
Proof of Proposition 2. The maximand in (1) is zero for b = 0. It is also zero for




= 0. By assumption, for each s there exists




given any s is strictly positive, establishing Part 1.
20In view of Part 1, the ﬁrst-order condition for the problem in (1) holds with equality
and hence takes the form in (15). Since pb (b;s) < 0 for p (b;s) 2 (0,1) and hence, by




, that condition can be written




Also by Assumption 1, pb (b;s)/p (b;s) is continuous non-increasing in b and hence
so is ￿p (b;s)/pb (b;s). Moreover, ￿p (b;s)/pb (b;s) is strictly positive for b = 0
and strictly less than b for some b because p (b;s) ! 0 as b ! b and pb (b;s) < 0 for
p (b;s) > 0 for all s. Thus (26) has a unique solution. To see that this solution is a








p (b;s)pbb (b;s) ￿ pb (b;s)
2
p (b;s)







The second derivative with respect to b of the maximand in (1) evaluated at b￿ (s) is




pbb (b￿ (s);s) + 2pb (b￿ (s);s)
￿ pb (b￿ (s);s) < 0,
the equality following from the ﬁrst-order condition (26) and the weak inequality from
(27), given pb (b￿ (s);s) < 0. Thus the second-order sufﬁcient condition for a maxi-
mum is satisﬁed at the unique solution to (15), establishing Part 2.
Part 3 follows directly from (26) and Assumption 1.
Proof of Proposition 3. Part 1. In view of (5), (12) can be written
b(s) 2 arg max
b2[0,b]
P(b)p (b;s) + P(0)[1￿ p (b;s)], for all s 2 [s,s].














> 0 for all s. Consider b(s) that, for some s, has P(b(s)) = P(0) or b(s) = b.
Then the agent’s expected utility from choosing b(s) given s is P(b(s)) = P(0), in the




= 0. But the agent could


















> 0. Thus b(s) isnotimplementable. Finally,









too. Thentheagent’spayoffisstrictlyincreasedbychoosing ˆ b ratherthan b(s) because
p (b;s) is strictly decreasing in b for each s for b < b. Thus it must be that P(b(s)) >
P(b) for all b < b(s).
Part 2. Since p (b;s) is differentiable in b for p (b;s) 2 (0,1), necessity of the ﬁrst-




and differentiability of P(b).
Let z(b) = P(b) ￿ P(0) and




The ﬁrst-order condition (16) can then be written p (b(s);s)W (b(s),s) = 0 for all s.




for all s and, by Assumption 1,
p (b(s);s) 2 (0,1) for all such b(s). So to implement b(.) requires W (b(s),s) = 0 for
all s. It is sufﬁcient for (16) to have at most one solution for each s, and for this solution
to be a maximum, that
pb (b(s);s)W (b(s),s) + p (b(s);s)Wb (b(s),s) < 0 for all s.
With W (b(s),s) = 0 and p (b(s);s) > 0, that will certainly hold if Wb (b(s),s) < 0
for each s. Because (16) must hold for all s, its total derivative with respect to s must
equal zero. With W (b(s),s) = 0 and p (b(s);s) > 0 for all s, that implies
dW (b(s),s)
ds
= Wb (b(s),s)b0 (s) +Ws (b(s),s) = 0. (28)
From the deﬁnition of W (b(s),s),








which, given P(b(s)) > P(0) and hence z(b(s)) > 0, is either strictly positive or
strictly negative under the conditions in Part 2(b). Thus (28) cannot be satisﬁed if
b0 (s) = 0. It can therefore be written











22Thus Wb (b(s),s) > 0 if b0 (s) and ¶
¶s (pb (b(s);s)/p (b(s);s)) have opposite signs, so
any solution to the ﬁrst-order condition cannot be a maximum, establishing necessity
of Part 2(b). Moreover, Wb (b(s),s) < 0 under the conditions in Part 2(b), which
establishes sufﬁciency of those and the ﬁrst-order conditions.




and satisﬁes (26). Moreover, the ﬁrst-
order condition for the agent (16) must hold for all s. It is then clear from comparison






, for all b 2 [b￿ (s),b￿ (s)]. (29)






, for all b 2 [b￿ (s),b￿ (s)],
which, by integration, has solution
z(b) = kb, for all b 2 [b￿ (s),b￿ (s)], (30)
for some constant of integration k. Part 3 follows because the solution for P(.) implied
by (30) is that given by (17) and, by the argument in Part 1, k > 0.
A series of preliminary lemmas is useful for proving Proposition 4.
Lemma 1 Deﬁne




,s 2 [s,s],a 2 fa,ag, (31)
P0 ￿ P(0), (32)











ds ￿ v(a). (34)






[b(s) ￿ z (s)]h(b(s),s;a) ￿ P0 [h(0,s;a) ￿ h(b(s),s;a)]
o
ds (35)
23subject to the dynamic constraints
z0 (s) = ￿c(s)[z (s) ￿ P0]
hb (b(s),s;a)
h(b(s),s;a)
, for all s 2 [s,s]; (36)
b0 (s) = c(s), for all s 2 [s,s]; (37)
and the inequality constraints
Z(a,b(.),z (.),P0) ￿ U ￿ 0; (38)
Z(a,b(.),z (.),P0) ￿ Z(a,b(.),z (.),P0) ￿ 0; (39)








strictly decreasing in s: c(s) ￿ 0, for all s 2 [s,s]; (42)
with free boundaries at s = s and s = s.






, for all (b,s,a). (43)
Then, with the further deﬁnitions (32)–(33), the principal’s objective function in (9)
can, in view of (7) and (8), be written as (35). With, in addition, the deﬁnition (34), the
constraints (10) and (11) can be written as (38) and (39).
Next consider the constraint (12). Under Assumption 1, by Part 2 of Proposition 3,
necessary and sufﬁcient conditions to induce the agent to select b(s) for all s are that
the ﬁrst-order condition (16) is satisﬁed and that
b0 (s) ￿ 0 for all s 2 [s,s] if pb (b;s)/p (b;s) strictly increasing in s, (44)
b0 (s) ￿ 0 for all s 2 [s,s] if pb (b;s)/p (b;s) strictly decreasing in s. (45)
The constraint (12) can, therefore, be replaced by these. They can, in turn, be re-written
in terms of h(b,s;a),z (s) and c(s) as in (36), (37), (41) and (42) by the following
argument. From (33),
z0 (s) = P0 (b(s))b0 (s). (46)
With this notation and (37), the ﬁrst-order condition (16) can be written




which, in view of (43), can be written as (36). In view of (37) and (43), the conditions
24(44) and (45) can be written as (41) and (42).
The remaining constraint in the principal’s problem is (13). By Part 1 of Proposition
3, the ﬁrst-order condition ensures b will be selected for s only if P(b) > P(0) ￿ P0.
Now consider b that is not to be selected for any s. If there exists b(s) < b for some s,
let ˆ b(b) = maxb(s) over s such that b(s) < b. If not, let ˆ b(b) = 0. Then it is sufﬁcient




￿ P(0) ￿ P0. Thus (40) is sufﬁcient to ensure that (13) is
satisﬁed.
Lemma 2 Deﬁne the Hamiltonian
H (a,b(s),z (s),P0,s)
= [b(s) ￿ z (s) + P0]h(b(s),s;a) ￿ P0h(0,s;a)
￿ y1 (s)c(s)[z (s) ￿ P0]
hb (b(s),s;a)
h(b(s),s;a)
+ y2 (s)c(s), for all s 2 [s,s], (47)
where y1 (s) and y2 (s) are multipliers attached to the constraints (36) and (37) respec-
tively. Then, providedanappropriateconstraintqualiﬁcationissatisﬁed(seeLéonardandLong
(1992)), Maximum Principle conditions for the principal’s problem in Lemma 1, in which l,m,
f and n(s) are multipliers attached in this order to the inequality constraints (38)–(41), are
for all s 2 [s,s]:
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= ￿h(b(s),s;a) ￿ [b(s) ￿ z (s) + P0]hb (b(s),s;a)
￿l[z (s) ￿ P0]hb (b(s),s;a) (49)
￿m[z (s) ￿ P0][hb (b(s),s;a) ￿ hb (b(s),s;a)]
+y1 (s)c(s)[z (s) ￿ P0]


















= ￿y1 (s)[z (s) ￿ P0]
hb (b(s),s;a)
h(b(s),s;a)






















￿ [h(0,s;a) ￿ h(b(s),s;a)] + l[h(0,s;a) ￿ h(b(s),s;a)]





ds + f; (51)
plus the original equality constraints




b0 (s) = c(s); (53)
the complementary slackness conditions
Z(a,.) ￿ U ￿ 0; l ￿ 0; l[Z(a,.) ￿ U] = 0; (54)
Z(a,.) ￿ Z(a,.) ￿ 0; m ￿ 0; m[Z(a,.) ￿ Z(a,.)] = 0; (55)




strictly increasing in s for all s 2 [s,s]:




strictly decreasing in s for all s 2 [s,s]:
c(s) ￿ 0; n(s) ￿ 0; n(s)c(s) = 0; (58)
and the boundary conditions
y1 (s) = y2 (s) = 0; (59)
y1 (s) = y2 (s) = 0. (60)
Proof. Direct consequence of the Maximum Principle.

































, for all s 2 [s,s]. (62)
26Proof. Condition (61) follows directly from (48). Conditions (49) can, in view of the




























Add[z (s) ￿ P0] times(61)to(63)notingthat, fromProposition3, z (s) ￿ P(b(s)) > P0
for all s and from (53) that c(s) = b0 (s), to get






























b(s) ￿ z (s) + P0
i












b(s) ￿ z (s) + P0
i
. (64)
From (50), it follows that




so, differentiating with respect to s,
y0
2 (s) = y0






























27Substitution for z0 (s) from (52) and use of (53) gives
y0
2 (s) = y0
















































Use of this in (64) gives














[z (s) ￿ P0] ￿
n0 (s)
hb (b(s),s;a)
































b(s) ￿ z (s) + P0
i



















































In view of (43), this can be re-arranged to give (62).
Lemma 4 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, provided the constraint b0 (s) ￿ 0 (b0 (s) ￿ 0)
is not binding in the neighbourhoods of s,s, an optimal contract implements b(s) with the
property b(s) = b￿ (s) for s = s,s.
Proof. Any solution for b(s) must satisfy the the Maximum Principle conditions
(48)-(60), so Lemma 3 applies. It follows from (59) that y1 (s) = 0, so the right-hand
side of (62) equals zero for s = s. It follows from (57) that, provided the constraint on
b0 (s)[￿ c(s)] is not binding in the neighbourhood of s, n(s) = 0 in that neighbour-
hood and thus n0 (s) = 0 also. A corresponding argument applies for s = s. Since
pb (b(s);s) = 0 is ruled out by Assumption 1 and Proposition 3, it must be that, for
both s and s, the term in square brackets on the left-hand side of (62) equals zero. It
then follows from (26) that b(s) = b￿ (s) for s = s,s.
Proof of Proposition 4. Note that
R s
s h(0,s;a)ds = 1 for all a because h(0,s;a) =




























ds + f. (66)



























1 (s)ds = y1 (s) ￿ y1 (s) and, from (59) and (60), y1 (s) = y1 (s) = 0. Thus,
the left-hand side of (67) equals zero. Use of that in (66) gives
l = 1￿ f. (68)
29Consider ﬁrst values of s for which y1 (s) = 0. By Lemma 2, any solution for b(s) must
satisfy the Maximum Principle conditions (48)-(60), so Lemma 3 applies. By Lemma 3,
















￿ 1 for s ￿ ˆ s;
f (s;a)
f (s;a)
< 1 for s > ˆ s.
Note that f,m > 0 when the lower bound on P0 is binding. Thus the right-hand
side of (69) is negative for s = s and increasing in s. So, either the right-hand side
of (69) is negative for all s or there exists an ˜ s > ˆ s such that it is negative for s ￿ ˜ s
and positive for s > ˜ s. It follows either that, for any s ￿ ˜ s for which y1 (s) = 0,
y0
1 (s) > 0 and, for any s > ˜ s for which y1 (s) = 0, y0
1 (s) < 0, or that y0
1 (s) > 0 for
all s for which y1 (s) = 0. The second of these cannot, however, be the case because
we know from (59) and (60) that y1 (s) = y1 (s) = 0. Thus, as s increases from s,
y1 (s) becomes positive and cannot change sign because, to do so, y0
1 (s) would have
to become negative and, since y0
1 (s) would remain negative for all higher s, y1 (s)
would not be able to satisfy y1 (s) = 0. Thus y1 (s) > 0 for all s 2 (s,s).
From Lemma 3, (62) must hold. When y1 (s) > 0 and z (s) > P0 for all s 2 (s,s), the
right-hand side of (62) is positive if pb (b;s)/p (b;s) is everywhere strictly increasing
in s and negative if pb (b;s)/p (b;s) is everywhere strictly decreasing in s. The term
multiplying the square bracket on the left-hand side is positive under Assumption
1. Thus, provided the constraint on b0 (s)[￿ c(s)] is not binding for any s, so that
n(s) = 0 for all s from (57) and thus also n0 (s) = 0 for all s, it must be that
p (b(s);s)
pb (b(s);s)







> 0 for all s;
p (b(s);s)
pb (b(s);s)







< 0 for all s.
But pb (b;s)/p (b;s) is non-increasing in b, so the left-hand sides of both these are in-
creasing in b(s). It follows from (26) that b(s) > b￿ (s) for s 2 (s,s) if pb (b;s)/p (b;s)
is everywhere strictly increasing in s and b(s) < b￿ (s) for s 2 (s,s) if pb (b;s)/p (b;s)
is everywhere strictly decreasing in s.
That establishes the result for all s 2 (s,s) provided the constraint on b0 (s) does
not bind for any s (and hence n(s) = n0 (s) = 0 for all s). To show that the result is un-
affected by having that constraint bind for some s, start with the case pb (b;s)/p (b;s)
everywhere strictly increasing in s in which that constraint takes the form b0 (s) ￿ 0.
Consider ﬁrst s = s. It follows from Lemma 4 that, if the constraint did not bind,
30b(s) = b￿ (s). Thus the constraint can bind only if b(s ￿ #) > b￿ (s) as # ! 0
from above and the effect of the constraint cannot be to reduce b(s). Thus certainly
b(s) ￿ b￿ (s). Moreover, by Part 3 of Proposition 2, b￿ (s) is strictly increasing so, if
b(s ￿ #) = b(s) ￿ b￿ (s), it is certainly the case that b(s ￿ #) > b￿ (s ￿ #). In addition,
for any s such that b(s) > b￿ (s), a similar argument implies b(s ￿ #) > b￿ (s ￿ #) as
# ! 0 from above even when the constraint binds. Thus b(s) > b￿ (s) for all s 2 (s,s)
whether or not the constraint binds. Finally, b(s + #) > b￿ (s + #) as # ! 0 from above
implies b(s + #) > b￿ (s), so having b(s) = b￿ (s), as implied by Lemma 4 if the con-
straint does not bind, cannot result in the constraint binding. Thus b(s) = b￿ (s). That
completes the proof of Part 1 of the proposition.
Now consider pb (b;s)/p (b;s) everywhere strictly decreasing in s for which the
constraint on b0 (s) takes the form b0 (s) ￿ 0. Again from Lemma 4, if the constraint
does not bind at s = s, then b(s) = b￿ (s). Thus the constraint can bind at s = s
only if b(s ￿ #) < b￿ (s) as # ! 0 from above and the effect of the constraint cannot
be to increase b(s). Thus certainly b(s) ￿ b￿ (s). Moreover, by Part 3 of Proposition
2, b￿ (s) is strictly decreasing so, if b(s ￿ #) = b(s) ￿ b￿ (s), it is certainly the case
that b(s ￿ #) < b￿ (s ￿ #). In addition, for any s such that b(s) < b￿ (s), a similar
argument implies b(s ￿ #) < b￿ (s ￿ #) as # ! 0 from above even when the constraint
binds. Thus b(s) < b￿ (s) for all s 2 (s,s) whether or not the constraint binds. Finally,
b(s + #) < b￿ (s + #) as # ! 0 from above implies b(s + #) < b￿ (s), so having b(s) =
b￿ (s), as implied by Lemma 4 if the constraint does not bind, cannot result in the
constraint binding. Thus b(s) = b￿ (s). That completes the proof of Part 2.
The following lemma is useful for proving Proposition 5.







































































if b(s) and pb (b;s)/p (b;s) are either both non-decreasing in s or both non-increasing in s






















































































, for s ￿ s00 ￿ s0 and s0 ￿ s00 ￿ s. (73)



































which is non-positive for s0 ￿ s00 and non-negative for s00 ￿ s0 if pb (b;s)/p (b;s) and





. This implies (73).
Proof of Proposition 5. Under Assumption 2, the decision rule b(.) to be imple-
mented always satisﬁes p (b(s);s) = 1. Thus a necessary condition for b(s) to satisfy
(22) over b ￿ b(s) for signal s is that
P0 (b(s)) + [P(b(s)) ￿ P]pb+(b(s);s) ￿ 0, for all s 2 [s,s]. (74)
This necessary condition can be re-written as (23). An implication of Lemma 5 is the
following. Consider b not to be selected for any s. If there exists b(s) < b for some
s, let ˆ b(b) = maxb(s) over s such that b(s) < b. If not, let ˆ b(b) = 0. Let P(.) be set




, as a result of which no such b is chosen for any s. Then
if, under the conditions given, P(.) is such that the agent prefers b(s0) to b(s00) given
signal s0 and b(s00) to b(s) given signal s00 for any signal s the opposite side of s00 from
s0, the agent also prefers b(s0) to b(s) given signal s0. Letting s00 approach s0 establishes
that, under the conditions of Lemma 5, a local optimum is also a global optimum. As
a result, (74) (and hence, (23)) is not only necessary but also sufﬁcient to ensure that
no b > b(s) is preferred to b(s) when b(s) and pb (b;s)/p (b;s) are either both non-





argument in the text, we already know that no b < b(s) is preferred to b(s) if P(.) is
non-decreasing.
Proof of Proposition 6. By Proposition 5, (23) must hold. For b(s) increasing, the
constraint (23) necessarily binds for all b by the argument in the text. Deﬁne z(b) =
P(b) ￿ P. Then, with s = b￿1 (b), (23) can be written




, for all b 2 [b(s),b(s)],




















, for all b 2 [b(s),b(s)],
with K = z(b(s)). Translating that solution back into the original notation establishes
the result.
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